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The argument of this article is that the urbanisation of rural, regional,and peripheral China has aims that include the modification of dis-course and the retelling of history, as well as the modification of space
and the remaking of everyday habits. The Chinese narrative of urbanisation
is intimately connected with the broader narratives of modernisation, de-
velopment, and “civilisation.” On the periphery of the Chinese state, this
narrative of urbanisation concurrently seeks to maintain stability and to ad-
vance cultural and economic integration with the core regions of China. In
other words, urbanisation has both tangible and intangible objectives, which
are interwoven, interdependent, and inherently political.
I present my case by outlining some of the social and spatial transforma-
tions of Korla, a small but relatively well-off city located on the northern
edge of the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang, western China. Korla is the administrative
centre for oil and gas exploitation in the Tarim Basin (South Xinjiang), has a
70% Han population, and is the fastest-developing urban region in Xinjiang.
Two large state institutions have been most influential in shaping the city
of Korla, both socially and spatially – the Xinjiang Production and Construc-
tion Corps, called bingtuan for short in Chinese, (1) and China National Pe-
troleum Corporation’s (CNPC) Tarim oil company (known as Tazhi). (2) The
bingtuan is associated with agriculture, low-paid, work and “behindness.”
Viewed from the metropole in eastern China, the bingtuan epitomises Xin-
jiang’s image as a “behind” (luohou 落後) and empty region. In direct con-
trast, the oil company is associated with China’s political and economic
elite, with the country’s modernisation and with modernity per se. 
Although Korla attained the bureaucratic status of a city in 1979, urban
development really began to take off only with the expansion of oil and gas
production in the Tarim Basin in the mid-1990s. The presence of the oil com-
pany means that the educational and consumption levels of the upper
socio-economic class in Korla are high by national standards. Similarly,
Korla’s urban space exhibits politico-aesthetic sensibilities that can be found
in aspirational cities across China – broad and long boulevards, tall signature
buildings, artificial watercourses, and government headquarters as a spatial
focus. As such, Korla presents itself as “ahead” in a place that is “behind” – an
outpost of metropolitan civility.
Demographics is a key element of this story. The Han in Korla today have
come to the region in a series of waves since 1949, two main ones being
the state-sponsored migration to work on the bingtuan through the 1950s,
and the economically-motivated self-sponsored migration that began in
the early 1990s, concurrent with the rapid growth of the Tarim oil company.
South Xinjiang is otherwise populated predominantly by Turkic Uyghurs,
and there is an underlying tension between Uyghur and Han in Xinjiang
that occasionally flares up into violence.
In the ethnically-infused battle for hearts and minds that plays out con-
stantly in Xinjiang, history and urban development (3) are front-line weapons.
The citizens of Korla are expected to “know their place” in official history
and in the hierarchy of modernity. The local official history is particularly
concerned with Han Chinese settlement in Korla and with Xinjiang’s rela-
tionship to the core regions of China. This history, as will be seen, is presented
not just verbally but also in institutional, spatial, and monumental forms in
Korla. It will also be seen how, in the process of urbanisation, the perspectives
and the daily lived habits of the population get shaped and remade. It is
through the remaking of habits that an empty “wasteland” becomes civilised,
and a place with “neither culture nor history” gets shaped into one with both. 
History and its making
Early urbanisation in Korla
Korla’s initial urbanisation derived from the bingtuan. The bingtuan was
founded after 1949 as a system of military-agricultural colonies, and was
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1. Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan (新疆生產建設兵團).
2. “Tazhi” is an abbreviation of Talimu youtian gongsi zhihuibu (塔里木油田公司指揮部). Both the
bingtuan and the oil company report directly to Beijing, rather than via the provincial-level Xin-
jiang government.
3. Becquelin noted the importance of urbanisation in peripheral assimilation, citing the great William
G. Skinner – see Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties,” The China Journal, Vol. 44, 2000, 
p. 75.
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the main force behind Han in-migration and cultural transformation in
Xinjiang until the late 1970s. Bingtuan pioneers and their offspring make
up a large proportion of the Han population of Korla, including the ma-
jority of those who were born in Xinjiang or settled in the region before
1980. Across Xinjiang, both the pioneers and their offspring strove to set-
tle in urban areas, in order to escape the harsh conditions on bingtuan
farms. 
The bingtuan today is almost entirely civilian, and is a weaker social, economic,
and political force than in the past, but it nevertheless remains important. The
bingtuan is both a state-owned enterprise group and a parallel “quasi-govern-
ment” in Xinjiang. (4) It has a population of 2.5 million, 12% of Xinjiang’s popu-
lation, but occupies 30% of the arable land. Although the bingtuan is located
within Xinjiang’s administrative jurisdiction, it has its own budget, its own police
force, and its own court system – a sort of bounded sovereignty. (5) Internally,
the bingtuan is arguably the least reformed bureaucratic entity of comparable
scope in China today. The resilience of the organisation is related to the fact
that it is still seen by the central government as playing an important role in
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4. Yubin Zhou and Ke Chen, “Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan xinxing chengzhenhua daolu jiexi
yiqi cheng-xiang guihua tixi goujian tansuo” (A study of XPCC’s new urbanisation and planning
system construction), Chengshi fazhan yanjiu (Urban development studies), Vol. 19, No. 5, 2012,
p. 38.
5. There are parallels here between the contemporary bingtuan and the inter-war South Manchurian
Railway Company. Prasenjit Duara’s concept of the “new imperialism” – the coexistence of domination
and exploitation with development and modernisation that was pioneered in Manchukuo – resonates
in Xinjiang’s relationship with the Chinese metropole, especially considering the massive increase in
state-directed investment in Xinjiang following the riots of July 2009. Prasenjit Duara, The New Im-
perialism and the Post-Colonial Developmental State: Manchukuo in comparative perspective, 1715,
30 January 2006, www.japanfocus.org/-Prasenjit-Duara/1715 (accessed on 22 August 2012).
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Map 1 – Map of Xinjiang in Asia. The square over the Korla region (main map) marks the boundaries of the map shown in Map 2. This
map shows the centrality of Korla to Xinjiang, and the centrality of Xinjiang to the Eurasian land mass. Many of the roads and railways
are new, or newly-paved and widened.
maintaining social and political stability in Xinjiang. In part, this is because the
bingtuan’s 94% Han population occupies key peri-urban, rural, and border re-
gions.
The soldier-farmers of the bingtuan were directed in the early 1950s to
“defend the border and open the wasteland” by establishing agricultural
colonies in strategic locations in Xinjiang. Xinjiang was seen by the victo-
rious Communists as a tabula rasa, just as the Qing dynasty emperors of
China did before them. (6) The fact that at the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949, Xinjiang was already a diverse and dusty
palimpsest of cultures, conflicts, and polities – both imagined and ex-
tant – presented no obstacle to this time-honoured conceit. It was, after
all, the conqueror’s prerogative. (7) In the decades since the bingtuan was
established, its evolution has framed the social, political, and economic
milieu of Xinjiang. Any understanding of contemporary Xinjiang must take
the bingtuan into account. (8)
Korla has been shaped by Han in-migration since 1949. At the inception
of “New China,” Han people amounted to only 1.4% of the population
of Korla, and it was a county town of fewer than 30,000 people. A few
small Uyghur villages spread out to the south of the township, and were
enclosed and somewhat protected by a large bend in the Peacock River
before the river enters the hard stony desert en route to extinction in
the wastelands to the east. After 1955, the in-migration of more than
55,000 Han tripled the total population, and by 1965 Han people were
in a 56.4% majority. (9) An administrative reshuffle partly explains this
rapid growth: Korla took over in 1960 from the nearby county of Yanqi
as the capital of Bayingguoleng Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, (10) and
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1864, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 110.
7. Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent: 1865-1923, Bloomington, Indiana University
Press, 2007, pp. 3-4; Bradley J. Parker and Lars Rodseth (eds.), Untaming the Frontier in Anthro-
pology, Archaeology, and History, Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 2005, p. 3.
8. For an analysis of the history and political roles of the bingtuan, see Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the
Nineties,” art. cit; Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and
Uyghur Discontent,” Policy Studies, Vol. 11, 2004; Thomas Matthew James Cliff, “Neo Oasis: The
Xinjiang Bingtuan in the Twenty-first Century,” Asian Studies Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2009.
9. Qiu Yuanyao (ed.), Xinjiang 50 Years 1955-2005, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Bureau of
Statistics, Beijing, China Statistical Press, 2005, p. 505.
10. Bazhou Government Net, Bayinguoleng Menggu zizhizhou lishi yange (Bayinguoleng Mongol Au-
tonomous Prefecture historical evolution), 23 June 2004, www.tianshannet.com/GB/channel59/
401/403/200406/23/94774.html (accessed on 24 November 2008).
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Map 2 – Korla City administrative region map. The irrigation channels of the bingtuan 29th and 30th Regiments can be seen in the top
left quadrant of the map. The Uyghur-populated rural areas are south and west of Korla City, around Awati Village. Korla City itself is
in the top right quadrant.
the bingtuan’s Second Agricultural Division shifted its headquarters to Korla
at the same time. (11)
The bingtuan’s unequalled transformative influence on the social space
and economy of the Korla region began in 1950 with the construction of a
large irrigation canal. The 18th Regiment Grand Irrigation Canal took 7,000
people nine months to build and enabled an irrigated area of 3,335
hectares. (12) Map 2 shows the geometric organisation of space in the newly-
opened areas associated with the bingtuan – compare the straight outlines
of the bingtuan irrigation channels and fields to the scribbly lines of natural
seasonal watercourses and irrigation deltas of the villages (many populated
largely by Uyghurs) to the south of Korla. Although this is a recent map, the
organisation of rural space – land and water resources – shown in it dates
from no later than the 1960s. The flat land presented no physical obstacle
to large-scale state-organised agriculture, and allowed the ordered geomet-
ric arrangement seen in these images.
Maoist ideology had labelled the land as wasteland and positioned nature
as an “enemy” to be conquered through violent struggle. (13) For the demo-
bilised soldiers-turned-bingtuan pioneers, the new “war” was posed as
equivalent to the arduousness and valour of the civil war that many of them
had fought for most of their adult lives. Subsequent waves of bingtuan set-
tlers, most of them civilian, came to Xinjiang in the 1950s and the 1960s
as what Mette Hansen calls “subaltern colonisers.” (14) They established their
sites of settlement “at the margins of civility.” (15) In Korla, this meant at-
tempting to farm the salty and inhospitable desert-fringe to the west of
what was then an agricultural market town.
Bingtuan settlers, and the organisation itself, have long sought to leverage
the discourse of their collective contribution to the type of development
favoured in Xinjiang by the central state. (16) In May 1966, the leader of a group
of “sent down educated youth” who had come from Shanghai to labour on a
bingtuan farm in Xinjiang declared: “The ever-changing picture of construction
in [Xinjiang] is marked with our writing. This is our greatest happiness.” (17) She
adopted the same narrative of selfless sacrifice and history-making transfor-
mation of a “behind” region that the state used to justify its actions, and
claimed primary agency in that narrative for herself and her peers. (18)
Consistent with the discourse of historical frontier emptiness, an oft-
stated claim among Han residents of Korla today is that “before Liberation
[1949], there was nothing much in Korla, just a dirty little river and a few
Uyghur farmers; even the Uyghurs came after the Han started to build the
city.” These Han people directly equate development with the physical at-
tributes of urbanisation and the height of the tallest buildings in town. On
more than one occasion, the availability and quality of restaurants in Korla  -
– public places of (literal) consumption  – was also presented to me as a
barometer of modernity and development:
One Sunday, just after we got to Korla [in 1991] and had been work-
ing [for the oil company] for a few weeks, I and a few classmates
from university decided to get together to eat a meal. At that time,
transportation was pretty undeveloped in Korla: we rode on mule
carts – you know, like only the Uyghurs use today. The roads were
dusty. There were only two places to go shopping, and pretty much
everything was single-storey. We spent more than an hour riding
around town on a mule cart before we found a place. That is to say,
restaurants and eating-places were very scarce (…) At that time,
[Korla] was really very behind.
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Photo 1 – The headquarters building of the Tarim oil com-
pany. The large amount of open space surrounding the buil-
ding emphasises that shortage of land was not the major in-
fluence on the company’s imposing high-rise design for the
headquarters building. © Tom Cliff
Korla was transfigured with increasing speed over the next two decades,
due to the development of oil production in the Tarim Basin and the growing
urban presence of the oil company. Among other things, the company con-
structed high-rise buildings in its compound that claimed and reclaimed
the increasingly-vertical skyline of Korla, and impressed the status of the
company on the city.
The Tarim oil company – Tazhi – is the aesthetic, aspirational, and spatial
core of urbanisation in Korla. The oil company compound showcases
modern-ness and a lifestyle that is associated with elite gated residential
communities in eastern metropolitan China, and is something to aspire to
for those outside the oil company. Life in the Tarim compound is quiet, reg-
imented, physically and economically very secure, and above all exclusive.
A Tazhi division head noted that “once you get into this state-owned en-
terprise, you are set for life.” According to a vice-director of the Urban Land-
scaping Department, “Tazhi is the only successful residential district in Korla”
because the watercourses and gardens of the commercially-built residential
districts are unmaintained, and are now dried-out and decrepit. Tazhi is
widely recognised as “the best work unit in Korla,” yet the oil company al-
most never takes on locals as permanent employees. New permanent em-
ployees are sourced from among the best and brightest young graduates
from universities across China, causing locals (both Han and non-Han) to
feel “left out” of the wealth and privilege associated with the oil company.
A number of locals explained to me that “Tazhi is not really a part of Korla.
It belongs to the centre” – meaning the central government.
Both energy production and commodity consumption by the highly-paid
oil company employees help to raise Korla’s political-economic status. The
city of Korla links its identity to oil and gas production, and thus portrays
itself as playing an instrumental role in China’s economic development.
Most sites of production, however, are far outside the city, and only half of
the city government’s annual taxation revenue in 2009 derived from pri-
mary and secondary industries combined – including agriculture, mining,
and oil and gas extraction. The other half was tax on tertiary industries – no-
tably real estate, retail spending, and services. (19) A local government cadre
referred to Korla as “a consumption city” (xiaofei chengshi 消費城市), due
largely to oil company salaries. In the national and international economic
picture, a high level of household consumption is a sign of advancement
and modernity. (20) In other words, today, the most exalted “constructors”
(jianshezhe 建設者) and the most dedicated consumers are one and the
same. One way that this particular historical narrative – of the development
of a “behind” place – is sustained and reinforced in the present is through
the creation and consumption of historical monuments.
Reimagining history through monuments
Korla’s public monuments explicitly represent the key junctures of the
meta-narrative that situates Korla historically – in particular, in relation to
the Chinese core region and Han endeavours in Xinjiang. Seven kilometres
to the north of Korla, for instance, is a monument, the Iron Gate Pass, which
represents the presence of Chinese officialdom from the Chinese core region
as early as the Han Dynasty – a primary basis of the contemporary Chinese
claim to Xinjiang. Within the city, three other grandiose monuments mark
key transition points of the official narrative history of Korla. These monu-
ments are representations of 1950s bingtuan commander Wang Zhen
(Photo 2), explorer/geologist Peng Jiamu (background, Photo 3), and the
Beijing 2008 Olympic torch (Photo 3). Wang Zhen’s contribution was to
build the large irrigation canal that gave life to the surrounding bingtuan
farms and gave regional political importance to Korla. Peng Jiamu perished
in the desert east of Korla while on an expedition to the ancient and once
“lost” city of Lop Nur in 1980. He is held up as a martyr, and is credited
with being instrumental in the successful development of the oil industry
in the Tarim Basin. The Olympic torch brings the global glory of the Han
civilisation, and the grand declaration of China’s rise that was the Beijing
Olympics, to the ethnic periphery. It is also a statement of allegiance by
Korla to the core of the nation and an assertion of Korla’s pride in being
part of this ascendance. The heightened nationalism of the torch relay, and
the demonstrations by separatists and human rights advocates, lend the
Korla Olympic torch monument an added emotive power in the context of
Xinjiang. Through this and other monumental declarations that dominate
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19. The revised resources tax implemented in July 2010 increased the revenue from primary industry,
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Interactions Following the July 2009 Unrest,” The China Journal, Vol. 68, 2012.
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“balancing” the Chinese economy. For further references, see Rod Tyers, “Looking Inward for
Growth,” in Huw McKay and Ligang Song (eds.), Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China,
Canberra, ANU E-Press, 2012.
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Photo 2 – Wang Zhen statue in Korla. Retired bingtuan pio-
neers bring their grandchildren here to (in their words) “edu-
cate them about the great man – old uncle Wang.” © Tom Cliff
key urban vistas, Korla’s urban development seeks to shape (or reshape) the
narratives of both the future and the past of Han Chinese settlement in Xin-
jiang. 
A fifth monument  makes the story of history in Korla explicit. The violence
inherent in civilising projects, and in this civilising project in particular, is
summed up in visual narrative form by a large relief panel that adorns one
side of a newly-built museum (see Photo 4). This political art is a celebration
of violence and its central role in the history of the Korla region, and in the
modern project more generally. (21) From the top, this panel commemorates
Han Dynasty military victories, the bingtuan pioneers’ “war on the waste-
land,” China’s development of atomic bomb technology at a no-longer-se-
cret location in the mountains to the north of Korla (recently opened as a
site of “Red Tourism”), and the oil company pioneers’ “campaign” to extract
oil from the Tarim Basin, with a jackhammer wielded like a machine gun.
The second important point to take from this mural and from the other
four monuments is the elision of non-Han agency, and even presence. There
is a 2,000-year gap between the Han dynasty expeditions and the arrival
of the bingtuan pioneers in 1950. Uyghurs and representatives of Xinjiang’s
other official ethnic minority groups are nowhere to be seen – they are in-
visible and unnoteworthy objects, not agents, of transformation. The mural
poses as significant only those events
that fall easily into a direct line with
today’s preferred history, in which all of
the agents of historical change are Han.
Even the Manchu-ruled Qing is omit-
ted – despite, and no doubt also because
of, the fact that the current territorial ex-
tent of the PRC owes its greatest debt
to Qing expansionism. It is as if the Qing
were merely a weak echo of Han dy-
nasty greatness, and not comparable to
the resurgence of the Han ethnicity in
the mid-twentieth century. The meta-
narrative proclaims and glorifies early
conquest, modern hegemony and mus-
cular legitimacy. This and the modernity
on display in Korla’s development – the
flashy buildings, wide roads, and artificial
watercourses – are emphatically lauded
by the Party-state, and attributed to its
institutional agents in Xinjiang  –  the
bingtuan, the army and, most prominently, the oil company.
City planning and the modern ideal in Korla
Korla’s relatively high political and economic profile in Xinjiang, combined
with the importance of Xinjiang to China’s economy and sense of domestic
social stability, (22) make it a political priority for the city to be seen as a
model of urban development. As tools of governance, city-planning models
are the physical manifestation of preconceived ideals, and need to be replic-
able. James Scott’s analysis in Seeing like a State is useful here:
A far-flung, polyglot empire may find it symbolically useful to have its
camps and towns laid out according to formula as the stamp of its order
and authority. Other things being equal, the city laid out according to
a simple, repetitive logic will be easiest to administer and to police. (23)
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Photo 3 – Cuckoo River and monuments in Korla’s New City
District. Looking north from the Petroleum Avenue Bridge,
September 2009. A replica of the Beijing Olympic torch
stands 25m high, on its own pontoon in the middle of the wi-
dest part of the river. In the distant background can be seen
a 20m high statue of Peng Jiamu. © Tom Cliff
Photo 4 – Relief mural on
the Bazhou Museum. The
mural is roughly 5m across
by 20m high, and the bot-
tom edge of it is at least
15m off the ground. 
© Tom Cliff
Scott considers this formula to be part of a “high-modernist ideology,”
and he notes that the “carriers of high modernism tended to see rational
order in remarkably visual aesthetic terms.” (24) It follows that we use visual
and spatial analyses to recount the development of this model.
The photographs and maps in this article illustrate that the organisation
of space and the built environment of urban Korla is increasingly in accor-
dance with the “administrative ordering of nature and society” that Scott
terms “legibility.” (25) Until the early 1990s, all but the bingtuan-dominated
“old” city centre of Korla was effectively still rural land in terms of how it
was organised and utilised (Photo 5). The fields, irregular boundaries, and
homes of extended families shown in the bottom half of Photo 5 are typical
of a rural organisation of space. In the past, the relative proportions and po-
sitions of agricultural land, courtyards, and low adobe-style dwellings de-
pended on the economic and population growth of these individual (mostly
Uyghur) family units. Photo 6 illustrates Korla’s transformation from a rural
centre to an urban model. These two photographs, and others later in this
article, show that in the twenty-first century, Korla increasingly conforms
to a planned, geometrically-ordered layout imposed from above. Materials
too have changed – from being predominantly brick, earth, and wood, to
being predominantly steel, concrete, and bitumen. The acceleration towards
a geometric organisation of space – both on the two-dimensional map and
in the three-dimensional built environment – is also a transition towards
legibility. Although it was the bingtuan, not the Tarim oil company, that ini-
tiated the project of legibility, Tazhi’s political and economic gravity has en-
abled and led an intensification of legibility and ideal modernity in urban
Korla. Legibility and a modern façade are, in the context of contemporary
China, conditions of being civilised. Thanks to the economic boom brought
on by the oil and gas extraction that began in the late 1980s, Korla is now
an “All China Civilised City.”
Civilisation: Remaking habits
Civilising the city is a teleological process, in that it has a series of stages
that must be passed through to reach a final destination. The final destina-
tion is imagined to be known, is often idealised, and is assumed to be im-
minent  –  reflecting what Immanuel Wallerstein calls “the enormous
subterranean strength of the faith in inevitable progress.” (26)
In contemporary PRC discourse, civilisation has both material aspects
(wuzhi wenming 物質文明: e.g. urban space, the built environment, con-
sumption, and standard of living) and spiritual aspects (jingshen wenming
精神文明). This latter aspect is what Chinese state discourse means by “civ-
ilized people”: civility in personal qualities and behaviour – the opposite of
being uncouth – e.g., properly educated, with good manners, taste, language,
and accent, and loyalty to the official concept of nation. Both Michel Fou-
cault and Norbert Elias have argued that the civilising mission is about nor-
malisation and standardisation. (27) As is implicit in this 2007 billboard in
Korla (Photo 7), civilisation in these terms is measured by the habits, habitat,
and habitus of the population, and is the foundation of a “harmonious so-
ciety.” In other words, only one type of civilisation, and therefore one route
to modernity, is posed as worthwhile here – a Han Chinese one.
The Korla City government and Party committee began a push to claim
the title of “Civilised City” in 1996, declaring April 2 “Founding spiritual civil-
isation mobilisation day.” In the following years, Korla was awarded a series
of increasingly prestigious awards, including: 1997 “All-China shuangyong
[army-people] model city”; (28) 1998 “China outstanding tourism city”; 1999
“National-level hygienic city”; 2004 “All-China technological progress model
city” and “National environmental protection model city”; 2005 “All-China
constructing civilisation advanced city” and “CCTV 2006 China top-10
charming city.” (29) However, in practice there is a sense among Korla officials
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Tom Cliff – Peripheral Urbanism
Photo 5 – Korla, late 1980s. The land that becomes the Tarim
oil company headquarters compound is in the foreground on
this side of the river. © Hou Jian
Photo 6 – Newer Korla: circa 2004. Everything pictured on
this side of the river belongs to the Tarim oil company com-
pound. © Hou Jian
and residents that the ideal is never reached – the objective is a moving
target that is always “up ahead.” A still-higher award, which is yet to be at-
tained, is “Ecological City” – described as an urban area in which humans
live in harmony with nature.
Alongside this rhetorical focus on the style of development, the vice di-
rector of the Urban Landscaping Department was also notably concerned
with crude growth when he outlined the city’s 2005 development plan to
me in 2008. He stated categorically that “the population of a city must keep
increasing” – from the 2010 figure of 550,000 to at least 800,000 by 2015.
Although this sounds like a tall order, almost half of the difference could be
made up by reclassifying the temporary migrants who do not currently hold
household registration in Korla. Spatially, the plan for Korla designates spe-
cific areas as, for example, green space (minimum 40%), waterways, resi-
dential, or government institutions, and includes an expansion of the urban
area from 38 km² to at least 60 km² over the 2010-2015 period.
Korla underwent a period of especially accelerated physical construction
in 2007-2009. When I got there in July 2007, I was struck by the large num-
ber of advertisements for as-yet unbuilt residential estates. Their promo-
tional strategies drew on a perceived desire for European, metropolitan, and
executive lifestyles – images of parkland, middle-class consumption, and
technology predominated. The prospective orientation that is inherent to
civilising projects, colonial endeavours, and the frontier was also strongly
present. A high-profile development named Future Zone is one example,
but another (Photo 9) is both more subtle and more distinctly Chinese in
its strategy. The name of this residential development – qiantu (迁徒 ),
meaning “to move/relocate” or “to change” – is a homonym of qiantu (前
途), meaning “future” or “prospects.” The emphasis on this combination of
concepts – relocation and future prospects – is quintessentially frontier. Mi-
grants from the core region look forward to making their fortune on the
frontier, spurred on by a long-running narrative that “Xinjiang is a place
where constructors engaged in opening up can make the best of them-
selves.” (30) Less universal, but no less striking, was the intimate connection
made in these real estate advertisements between urban watercourses (ex-
isting or planned) in this desert region, centres of administrative power, and
high-status residential areas. The brochures and billboards often situated
the planned residential district in spatial relationship to the offices of the
city or of the prefectural government as well as to at least one of the four
main public bodies of water in the urban area. (31) Residential districts often
also advertised their own water feature within the compound. Such for-
consumption water features have displaced an earlier network of irrigation
canals that were used primarily for productive and practical purposes, and
were associated with small-scale agriculturalists – most of whom were
Uyghur.
Urban transformation, Uyghur dislocation
The rate and style of urban reconstruction – and social change – can be
seen in the following four images. Photos 10 to 13 show the redevelopment
of socially and spatially porous urban villages on the eastern side of Korla
into gated residential compounds. Most of the landowners in the urban
villages are Uyghurs who live in single-story adobe and brick dwellings that
they have progressively added to as their family size and wealth grew. Their
economy is semi-subsistence: most families grow vegetables for their own
consumption, and may raise a few sheep or goats that they then consume
or convert into cash; the landed families tend cash-crop orchards of the
nationally-famous Korla fragrant pear. Compensation (calculated per
square meter) for this agricultural land is less than one half of the com-
pensation for residential land whose buildings are not declared “illegal.”
This is a point of great tension and an opportunity for corrupt and coercive
behaviour on the part of state actors. For their part, Uyghurs living in vil-
lages in line for demolition hastily extend the floor area of their dwellings.
Although some profess to be quite happy with their compensation, most
Uyghurs are extremely reluctant to leave their extended family compounds
for the sterility and atomisation of a distant apartment complex. It is not
just family life that is upset – many Uyghurs are self-employed and run
businesses that rely on a base close to the city centre. For them, relocation
means unemployment. On the whole, Korla’s current wave of urban recon-
struction means a disruptive change in the practices of inner-city Uyghurs’
everyday life – including cooking, eating, cultural production, and social
reproduction.
The Uyghur residential buildings that are being eradicated in Korla helped
to sustain Uyghur community life, though it cannot be said that the build-
ings and layout of the villages represented some fundamental symbol of
Uyghur-ness. These villages have not developed organically over hundreds
of years – as in the case of Kashgar, for example. Instead, a regular diamond
20 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 3 / 3
30. Enmao Wang, “Xinjiang she kaituo jianshezhe da you zuowei de difang” (Xinjiang is a place where
constructors engaged in opening up can make the best of themselves), Lilun Yuekan (The Theory
Monthly), Vol. 10, 1985.
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Special feature
Photo 7 – Billboard in the New City District, 7m high by 80m long. © Tom Cliff
latticework of roads – clearly a product of a recently preceding round of
construction in Xinjiang – is what is being drawn over. The inner-city Uyghur
villages have developed in relation to these roads, and the overall layout
appears to result from a relatively recent but nevertheless quite complex
process of accommodation and adaptation between mainly Uyghur agri-
culturalists and the mainly Han state. (32) Large new boulevard-type roads,
designed for the car and arranged on a grid pattern, make “no compro-
mise” (33) with the pre-existing spatial form.
The project to transform space and society is far from complete. Appar-
ently finished buildings rise out of rubble, and artificial stream beds run
weakly – if at all. Korla’s “civilised” façade, impressive as it is, is in many
places only skin deep: scratch the surface and you will find a provincial
desert town. Urban planning policies require developers to construct tall
signature buildings on highly visible street corners and along major thor-
oughfares. The old urban villages are walled in, out of sight, before being de-
molished altogether and their residents relocated. 
A stroll through these back alleys reveals the diversity of the popula-
tion – a diversity stemming from when they came to Korla, where they
came from, why they came, what they do now, and how they identify
themselves. The stroller meets groups of disoriented migrant labourers from
central and eastern China, old bingtuan people and their children, old Korla
people who never quite recovered from the final collapse of state enter-
prises during the 1990s, well-off employees of state enterprises that are
doing well, Uyghurs whose families have lived around Korla for generations,
and other Uyghurs just arrived off the slow bus from Kashgar. Every urban
resident is engaged in consuming and re-creating the narrative of urban
development and transformation. Many take on the narrative – or want
to – but even those who don’t eventually have little choice but to change
their habits.
Urbanisation as habit
Urbanisation is a process of remaking habits. In Korla, as in cities across
China, habits are forced to change when villages are transformed into urban
residential communities, when spaces of production are transformed into
spaces of consumption, and when an assumption of peripheral “behindness”
becomes an expectation of metropolitan modernity. Old pathways disap-
pear under high-volume road grids, forcing people to modify the way they
move through the city and thus whom they encounter. Walter Benjamin’s
essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” clearly sig-
nalled how architecture and urban space has a corporeal impact on humans:
“Buildings are appropriated in a twofold manner: by use and by perception…”
He goes on to claim that “the tasks which face the human apparatus of per-
ception at the turning points of history cannot be solved by optical means,
that is, by contemplation, alone. They are mastered gradually by habit…” (34)
The very act of living in a constantly-changing city works to transform the
residents’ habits of mind and body.
Han and Uyghur people respond to the disruption of habits in quite dif-
ferent ways. As shown above, it is usually Uyghur neighbourhoods, and the
roads running to and through them, that are destroyed to make way for the
new plan. Relocated Uyghurs experience massive social and economic
changes to their lives. Many Uyghurs justifiably see the destruction of old
roads and neighbourhoods as an imposition. Han, on the other hand, tend
to see such destruction as a necessary condition of advancement, and an
inevitable stage in the modernisation project. Many Han honestly fail to
understand why Uyghurs would rather stay in unheated, earth-floored
houses than in modern apartments. For Han migrants, change is not only
an aspiration but also a way of life – beginning with their migration from
the core area and continuing with their implicit or explicit role as agents of
development and civilisation. 
The aesthetics and objectives of peripheral urbanisation are, by definition,
Han- and metropole-centric. The coercive force of urbanisation processes
are being brought to bear on Uyghurs, but Uyghurs and other non-Han eth-
nicities are not the only objects of this element of the civilising project in
Xinjiang. Han people – especially rural, regional, and peripheral (including
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Tom Cliff – Peripheral Urbanism
Photo 8 – An advertisement for a residential development in
the New City District. The new city government is the com-
plex on the left of frame, just across the road from the Man-
Made Lake. The estate itself is represented by the neatly-ali-
gned buildings in the centre of the picture. © Tom Cliff
Photo 9 – Location is the primary selling point of this resi-
dential estate (the large rectangle on the map). The star on
the map is the new city government – and of course Man-
Made Lake. The ribbon-like strip to the left of the map is the
Peacock River, and over it is the centre of town.  © Tom Cliff
Xinjiang) Han people – are also seen to have “nasty habits.” (35) Although
the final objective – integration of the ethnic periphery created by the Qing
dynasty and inherited from the Qing by the Republic and then the People’s
Republic – has not changed markedly over the course of the past 60 years,
the social and political context that this colonial endeavour is unfolding
within, and creating, certainly has. Han migration to Xinjiang today is pre-
dominantly voluntary, rather than state-sponsored and coercive as in the
past; many migrants are self-employed, or work in services or the construc-
tion industry in the urban centres; and these days, most migrants are not
members of large formal state institutions like the bingtuan and the oil
company. Furthermore, the Han population of Xinjiang is now within a few
percentage points of the Uyghur population, even by official figures. (36) The
changed, and changing, context has necessitated an adjustment of the
methods and processes of peripheral integration. In particular this means
an adjustment of the aesthetics, economics, and demographics of settle-
ment, which in turn means accelerating a particular style of urban devel-
opment in both the cities and the rural town centres of Xinjiang. In a sense,
the lure of the city is taking over part of the role that formal state institu-
tions performed in the past – in attracting, regulating, and transforming the
(Han) in-migrants – as well as in regulating and transforming the lifestyles
of the Han, Uyghurs, and others already in Xinjiang.
City building as frontier consolidation
The quintessentially rural and peripheral bingtuan has also recently taken
on the ideology of urbanism. In direct response to the violent conflict and
political upheaval that began with the ethnic riots of July 2009 in Xinjiang,
the organisation’s founding mandate – “opening wasteland, garrisoning the
frontier” – was officially, and at the highest level, modified to: “building
cities, garrisoning the frontier.” (37) “Garrisoning the frontier” in this context
is less a military exercise than a cultural, demographic, and politico-aes-
thetic project – modern urbanisation. The bingtuan needs an urban model
to counteract its chronic problem of depopulation (especially among able-
bodied, working- and reproductive-age men and women), and it is impera-
tive that the first of the new urban models is seen to succeed if there is any
hope of slowing this population flow and attracting new settlers.
City-building could signal a transformation in the political economy of
Xinjiang. Academics from the influential Urban Planning and Design Insti-
tute at Shanghai Tongji University recently argued strongly for the admin-
istrative, as well as spatial and economic, merging of peri-urban bingtuan
areas with the local urban centre. (38) There is some logic in this: an urban
centre has social, political, economic, and cultural gravity that a market
town does not, and this allows the urban centre to project its place-making
over a broader geographical area. A few years earlier, planners argued for a
“stratagem of comparative centralisation,” pointing out that aridity, large
distances between oases, and the relatively small economic scale of urban
areas in Xinjiang mitigate against the construction of an urban network with
multiple centres. (39) Moreover, bingtuan cadres confirmed in early 2013 that
formal ranking as a city in the non-bingtuan administrative system will
allow thus-classified bingtuan areas to tax residents and economic activity
within their jurisdiction. This is important, since it grants a previously-un-
available source of income and affirms the bingtuan’s nested autonomy
while simultaneously blurring certain boundaries between it and the non-
bingtuan system. Could this be the peripheral version of an urban agglom-
eration – the Greater Shanghai region writ super-small?
The first of the new peri-urban developments will be constructed on the
site of the bingtuan’s 29th and 30th Regiments to the west of Korla (see
Map 2). Bingtuan Regiments are functionally equivalent to market town-
ships in the local government system. While the former bingtuan areas clos-
est to Korla have already been incorporated into the urban area, these
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Photo 10 – Dispossession and disorientation. Inside a now-
demolished section of the Uyghur residential area. Demoli-
tions are often impending for many years – facilities and ser-
vices are gradually downgraded or cut off entirely – but tend
to proceed rapidly when they do start. © Tom Cliff
Photo 11 – Salvage and relocation. A former Uyghur residen-
tial and pear-orchard area of the old city. © Tom Cliff
urbanised townships are to become a “satellite city” of Korla. They will sup-
posedly benefit from proximity to Korla as the area’s logistics hub and as a
centre of consumption. (40)
Conclusion
My visual and spatial exploration of the urban morphology, architecture,
and monuments of Korla shows a strong push towards the currently-dom-
inant nationwide ideal of urban Chinese modernity. (41) In Xinjiang, these
grand plans of engineering are far less constrained – by history, culture, or
space – than in central and eastern China. The plans and their implementa-
tion are also inflected by the need to present a particular set of nested im-
ages – of Korla and its truncated history; of the centre and its power and
benevolence; and of the nation and its unity. But unlike some other Chinese
cities that lie “Beyond the Great Wall,” the urban morphology and architec-
ture of Korla pay only the most superficial tribute to the history, culture,
and aesthetics of the local non-Han. (42) And although cities on the Chinese
frontier today take the aesthetics of the core regions of China as their
model, they do not slavishly emulate the core. Rather, an aesthetic is emerg-
ing that is associated with the Han – and with the core that they implicitly
represent, whether or not they have ever been there – but is peripheral. This
aesthetic is framed by a different history and looks forward to a different
future to that of the core aesthetic.
Urbanisation is often treated as a process of transforming space and social
relations. Here I have expanded on this idea in two different ways. First, I
have tried to show that urbanisation in a city like Korla on the Chinese fron-
tier entails a particular process of remaking history and place. Second, I have
suggested that how people experience urbanisation – how they remake
their habits of mind and body – is itself a key objective of urban develop-
ment in China. (43) This place-, history-, and subject-making is considered
politically useful, even essential, to nation-building on the frontier.
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Photo 12 – Suburbia displaced: an exclusive villa develop-
ment adjacent to the land in Photo 11. © Tom Cliff
Photo 13 –The suburban dream only goes so far. The villas sat
surrounded by sandy desert and hemmed-in by construction
sites from when they were built in 2004 until at least 2011. 
© Tom Cliff
